University of Central Florida

STARS
Faculty Bibliography 2010s

Faculty Bibliography

1-1-2011

FDA Recalls Not as Alarming as They Seem
Jason T. Connor
University of Central Florida

Roger J. Lewis
Donald A. Berry
Scott M. Berry

Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/facultybib2010
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu
This Letter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Bibliography at STARS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Bibliography 2010s by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please
contact STARS@ucf.edu.

Recommended Citation
Connor, Jason T.; Lewis, Roger J.; Berry, Donald A.; and Berry, Scott M., "FDA Recalls Not as Alarming as
They Seem" (2011). Faculty Bibliography 2010s. 1205.
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/facultybib2010/1205

Inverse Association Between Duration
of Use of Acid-Suppressive Medications
and Fracture Risk

T

he article by Abrahamsen et al,1 suggests that
our article on proton pump inhibitor (PPI)
use and fracture risk,2 has “suggested a causal
relationship.”

See also page 998
This is not a correct interpretation of our findings: although we found a small overall association between PPI
use and fracture, we emphasized that “there was inverse
association between duration of use of acid-suppressive
medications and fracture risk, which does not support
adverse effects on the bone.”2(p1997)
Frank de Vries, PharmD, PhD
Author Affiliation: Division of Pharmacoepidemiology
and Pharmacotherapy, Utrecht Institute for Pharmaceutical Sciences, Utrecht, the Netherlands.
Correspondence: Dr de Vries, Faculty of Science, Division of Pharmacoepidemiology and Clinical Pharmacology, Utrecht University, Sorbonnelaan 16, 3584 CA,
Utrecht, the Netherlands (f.devries@uu.nl).
Financial Disclosure: The Department of Pharmacoepidemiology and Clinical Pharmacology, employing
Dr de Vries, has received unrestricted funding
for pharmacoepidemiological research from
GlaxoSmithKline, the private-public funded Top Institute Pharma (http://www.tippharma.nl, which includes
cofunding from universities, government, and industry), the Dutch Medicines Evaluation Board, and the Dutch
Ministry of Health. Dr de Vries has formerly worked as
an epidemiologist for the General Practice Research
Database, which is owned by the UK Department of Health
and operates within the Medicines and Healthcare
Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). The General
Practice Research Database is funded by the MHRA,
Medical Research Council, various universities,
contract research organizations, and pharmaceutical
companies.
1. Abrahamsen B, Eiken P, Eastell R. Proton pump inhibitor use and the antifracture efficacy of alendronate [published online February 14, 2011]. Arch
Intern Med. 2011;171(11):998-1004.
2. de Vries F, Cooper AL, Cockle SM, van Staa TP, Cooper C. Fracture risk in
patients receiving acid-suppressant medication alone and in combination with
bisphosphonates. Osteoporos Int. 2009;20(12):1989-1998.

In reply

My colleagues and I are sorry if the introduction in our
article1 gave the impression that the authors of the 2009
publication by de Vries et al2 considered their findings
suggestive of causality. This interpretation of their findings was solely our own. The study by de Vries 2 is
referred to in more detail in the “Comment” section,
where we note that while the effect could not be shown to
persist with longer durations of PPI treatment, most
patients were coadministered PPIs for less than 12

months. We are grateful to Dr de Vries for this opportunity to clarify.
Bo Abrahamsen, MD, PhD
Author Affiliation: Department of Medicine and Endocrinology F, Copenhagen University Hospital Gentofte,
Hellerup, Denmark.
Correspondence: Dr Abrahamsen, Department of Medicine and Endocrinology F, Copenhagen University
Hospital Gentofte, DK-2900 Hellerup, Denmark
(b.abrahamsen@physician.dk).
Financial Disclosure: Dr Abrahamsen has received consultancy fees from Nycomed, Amgen, and Novartis; research grants from Roche, Amgen, and Novartis; and
speakers fees from Servier, Eli Lilly, and MSD.
1. Abrahamsen B, Eiken P, Eastell R. Proton pump inhibitor use and the antifracture efficacy of alendronate [published online February 14, 2011]. Arch
Intern Med. 2011;171(11):998-1004.
2. de Vries F, Cooper AL, Cockle SM, van Staa TP, Cooper C. Fracture risk in
patients receiving acid-suppressant medication alone and in combination with
bisphosphonates. Osteoporos Int. 2009;20(12):1989-1998.

HEALTH CARE REFORM
FDA Recalls Not as Alarming
as They Seem

T

he article by Zuckerman et al1 reported that 80
(71%) of the 113 high-risk medical devices recalled by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) between 2005 and 2009 were originally approved via the 510(k) process (§510[k] of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act) rather than the more stringent premarket approval (PMA) application process and concluded that more stringent regulation is required.1 However, when they evaluated the frequency with which
approved devices were recalled, the authors failed to calculate the most appropriate measure, namely the probability that a device approved via either pathway would
subsequently be subject to a high-risk recall. Specifically, the authors calculated the proportion of recalled
devices that were approved via each pathway rather than
calculating the proportion of devices approved via each
pathway that were recalled. We provide the pertinent calculation herein.

See also page 1006
From 2005 to 2009, there were 16 522 medical devices approved via the 510(k) pathway and 145 approved via the PMA pathway.2 While some of the recalled devices were likely approved prior to this period,
these numbers can be used to estimate the relative numbers of devices approved via each mechanism. Thus, devices approved via the 510(k) pathway had an approximate recall rate of 0.48% (80 of 16 522), while those
approved via the PMA mechanism had a recall rate of
14.5% (21 of 145). In other words, a premarketapproved device is approximately 30 times more likely
to be recalled than a 510(k)-approved device. This suggests, in contrast to the conclusions reached by Zuckerman
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et al,1 that the premarket-approved devices are substantially higher risk.
We believe the FDA should continually reassess and
identify the best methods for product review and approval to ensure that only safe and effective devices come
to market. This process should be based on a determination of the risk and benefit associated with each device. The risk of a recall for a device is best assessed using
the probabilities provided herein rather than those calculated in the article by Zuckerman et al.1
Jason T. Connor, PhD
Roger J. Lewis, MD, PhD
Donald A. Berry, PhD
Scott M. Berry, PhD
Author Affiliations: Berry Consultants, College Station, Texas (Drs Connor, Lewis, D.A. Berry, and S. M.
Berry); University of Central Florida College of Medicine, Orlando (Dr Connor); Harbor-UCLA Medical Center, Los Angeles, California (Dr Lewis); and University
of Texas M. D. Anderson Cancer Center, Houston (Dr
D. A. Berry).
Correspondence: Dr Connor, Berry Consultants, University of Central Florida College of Medicine,
9757 Cypress Pine St, Orlando, FL 32827 (jason
@berryconsultants.com).
Financial Disclosure: Berry Consultants provides trial
design and statistical consulting services to many medical device companies.
1. Zuckerman DM, Brown P, Nissen SE. Medical device recalls and the FDA approval process [published online February 14, 2011]. Arch Intern Med. 2011;
171(11):1006-1011.
2. Office of Device Evaluation Annual Performance Report. Fiscal Year 2009.
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports
/UCM223893.pdf. Accessed April 13, 2011.

In reply

Connor et al conclude that the large percentage of highrisk recalled devices that have been cleared through the
FDA’s less stringent 510(k) process is acceptable because
only 113 of thousands of types of devices were recalled.
Their analysis does not take into account the impact of
dangerous medical devices on the health of patients or the
costs of health care. It also does not consider the importance of federal agencies following the law consistently in
their regulation of medical products.
Current law requires the FDA to use their more rigorous review, the PMA process, if a medical device is life
sustaining or otherwise high risk.1 The 510(k) process is
intended for devices that are lower or moderate risk.1 We
pointed out that if a medical device can severely injure or
kill patients when it fails, then it is not a low- or
moderate-risk device and should have been approved
through the PMA process. Unfortunately, the FDA designates many new devices as moderate risk and clears them
through the 510(k) process but later recalls the devices
after they kill or seriously injure patients. Most high-risk
recalls are caused by predictable problems (such as
implant breakage, deterioration, or manufacturing
defects); therefore, there should be few high-risk recalls
among devices that are truly low or moderate risk.

The economic and human costs of high-risk recalls are
substantial. Our new analysis finds that the 113 high-risk
recalls between 2005 and 2009 involved 112.6 million products. In just the first 6 months of 2010, there were more than
437 million high-risk recalled products that were 510(k)
devices,2 equaling 1.4 high-risk–recalled devices for each person in the United States. Examples in 2010 include millions of inaccurate glucose test strips that could result in
death.
Because physician reporting of adverse reactions is voluntary, deaths and injuries related to defective medical
devices are severely undercounted.3 Based on data on the
FDA Web site, we calculated 4556 deaths associated with
medical devices in 2009, a 60% increase compared with
2006.4 (Note: Our calculation was based on the 5547
deaths reported to MAUDE [Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience Database] in 2009, subtracting
duplicate death reports.) Almost half (n=2006, or 44%) of
the deaths were blamed on devices that had been cleared
through the 510(k) process or were exempt from any regulatory review because the FDA considered them very low
risk. Two-thirds (n = 3040) of the deaths were linked to
cardiovascular devices and 12% (n = 561) were linked to
general hospital devices. Annuloplasty rings, used for valve
repair, are a 510(k) device that was associated with 152
deaths in 2009, for example.
Connor et al attempt to calculate the percentage of devices cleared through the 510(k) process that were subsequently high-risk recalls. However, many devices cleared
through the 510(k) process are never sold in the United States,
some are never sold anywhere, and many sell very few products. As a result, the total number of cleared devices is an
inflated denominator that should not be used for evaluating
the safety of 510(k) devices.
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO)
found that almost 87% of the 3510 recalls from 2005
through 2009 were high or moderate risk. Even using the
denominator of 16 667new devices in the letter by Connor
et al, this increases the serious recall rate to 18%. Although
not all these recalled devices are potentially fatal, many
require surgical removal or present other serious risks,
such as the 158 moderate-risk recalls for artificial hips,
knees, and joint components.
In conclusion, lives could be saved, patients’ quality of
life improved, and medical costs would decrease if all potentially high-risk devices were subjected to the more rigorous PMA process, which requires clinical trials and premarket inspections, includes authority for postmarket studies
as a condition of approval, and gives the FDA the authority
to rescind approval of unsafe devices.
Diana M. Zuckerman, PhD
Paul Brown, BS
Steven E. Nissen, MD
Author Affiliations: National Research Center for Women
& Families, Washington, DC (Dr Zuckerman and Mr
Brown); and Department of Cardiovascular Medicine,
Cleveland Clinic, Cleveland, Ohio (Dr Nissen).
Correspondence: Dr Zuckerman, National Research Center for Women & Families, 1701 K St NW, Ste 700, Washington, DC 20006 (dz@center4research.org).
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Financial Disclosure: Dr Zuckerman owns stock in
Johnson & Johnson. Dr Nissen consults for many pharmaceutical companies but requires them to donate all
honoraria or consulting fees directly to charity so that
he receives neither income nor a tax deduction for his
services. The Cleveland Clinic Center for Clinical
Research has received funding to perform clinical trials
from Pfizer, Astra Zeneca, Novartis, Novo Nordisk,
Roche, Daiichi-Sankyo, Karo Bio, Takeda, sanofiaventis, Resverlogix, and Eli Lilly. Dr Nissen is involved
in these clinical trials, but he receives no personal
remuneration for his participation.
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